Judging athletes’ moral actions: some critical reflections

Approving or disapproving of athletes’ moral conduct and character is commonplace. In this essay I explore to what extent such judgements are valid and reliable moral judgements. I identify some methodological problems associated with making moral judgements particularly, but not exclusively, from a virtue perspective. I argue that we have no reliable access to states of mind needed to make informed evaluations. Moreover, even if such access was available, the validity of our judgements would be compromised or limited by our own moral character

On Justification, Idealization, and Discursive Purchase

Conceptions of acceptability-based moral or political justification take it that authoritative acceptability, widely conceived, constitutes, or contributes to, validity, or justification. There is no agreement as to what bar for authoritativeness such justification may employ. The paper engages the issue in relation to (i) the level of idealization that a bar for authoritativeness, ψ, imparts to a standard of acceptability-based justification, S, and (ii) the degree of discursive purchase of the discursive standing that S accords to people when it builds ψ. I argue that (i) and (ii) are interdependent: high idealization values entail low discursive purchase, while high degrees of purchase require low idealization values. I then distinguish between alethic conceptions of justification that prioritize ends that commit to high idealization values, and recognitive conceptions that favor high discursive purchase. On this basis, I argue for a moderately recognitivist constraint on idealization. To render the recognitive discursive minimum available to relevant people at the site of justification, S should set ψ low enough so that it is a genuine option for actual people to reject relevant views in ways that S recognizes as authoritative. (The Appendix applies this to a Forst-type view of reciprocity of reasons to draw out some limitations of this view.) [Draft available from author on request.

Normative Ethics Does Not Need a Foundation: It Needs More Science

The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights

Edging toward ‘reasonably’ good corporate governance

Over four decades, research and policy have created layers of understandings in the quest for “good” corporate governance. The corporate excesses of the 1970s sparked a search for market mechanisms and disclosure to empower shareholders. The UK-focused problems of the 1990s prompted board-centric, structural approaches, while the fall of Enron and many other companies in the early 2000s heightened emphasis on director independence and professionalism. With the financial crisis of 2007-09, however, came a turn in some policy approaches and in academic literature seeking a different way forward. This paper explores those four phases and the discourse each develops and then links each to assumptions about accountability and cognition. After the financial crisis came pointers n policy and practice away from narrow, rationalist prescriptions and toward what the philosopher Stephen Toulmin calls “reasonableness”. Acknowledging that heightens awareness of complexity and interdependence in corporate governance practice. The paper then articulates a research agenda concerning what “reasonable” corporate governance might entail

Understanding the rift, the (still) uneasy bedfellows of History and Organization Studies

Although the use of History has become increasingly discussed and more widely applied within Organization Studies (OS), its relevance for OS still remains far from centrally accepted. This article historicizes the relationship between Sociology and History as a means of better understanding the tensions, perceived and real, that exist between History and Organization Studies. In particular we analyse three differences of epistemological standpoint (method, objectivity and usefulness) that are commonly seen as the foundation stones to incompatibility. Perhaps surprisingly for an analysis of apparent disciplinary differences, we find that these distinctions in terms of approach, once closely examined, are rarely clear-cut and historians and OS scholars are frequently closer in intention and method than they are distant. However, despite their large intersection of interests, we argue that important distinctions between the two fields should be acknowledged. Our contribution to the debates over the need for more historical approaches within OS therefore centrally rests on abandoning aspirations for fully integrative models of working together, in favour of cooperative modes that concede the fields’ differences. This subtle shift of emphasis will, we believe, greatly benefit OS scholars who hope to include historical perspectives in their work

Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148346/1/pops12571.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148346/2/pops12571_am.pd

Satisfaction with Creativity: A Study of Organizational Characteristics and Individual Motivation

In answering the question of what influences satisfaction with creativity in the workplace, this work takes into account the extent to which the organization supports human aspiration to act creatively. The work throughout reflects a pragmatist approach to creativity and fulfillment, bridging it with needs theory in psychology. The empirical model uses survey data encompassing over 4,000 workers in Italian social enterprises. Results show that satisfaction with creativity is supported, at organizational level, by teamwork, autonomy, domain-relevant competences, as well as by inclusive, fair processes and relationships. At the individual level, satisfaction with creativity is enhanced by the strength of intrinsic initial motivations. The analysis of interaction terms shows that teamwork and workers' initial motivations are complementary in enhancing satisfaction with creativity, while a high degree of domain-relevant competences appears to substitute advice and supervision by superiors in accomplishing the desired level of creative action

Variety of Methodological Approach in Economics

It has been argued by some that the distinction between orthodox economics and heterodox economics does not fit the growing variety in economic theory, unified by a common methodological approach. On the other hand, it remains a central characteristic of heterodox economics that it does not share this methodological approach, but rather represents a range of alternative methodological approaches. The paper explores the evidence, and arguments, for variety in economics at different levels, and a range of issues which arise. This requires in turn a discussion of the meaning of variety in economics at the different levels of reality, methodology, method and theory. It is concluded that there is scope for more, rather than less, variety in economic methodologies, as well as within methodologies. Further, if variety is not to take the form of “anything goes”, then critical discussion by economists of different approaches to economics, and of variety itself, is required